The Maude-NRL Protocol Analyzer (Maude-NPA) is a tool and inference system for reasoning about the security of cryptographic protocols in which the cryptosystems satisfy different equational properties. It both extends and provides a formal framework for the original NRL Protocol Analyzer, which supported equational reasoning in a more limited way. Maude-NPA supports a wide variety of algebraic properties that includes many crypto-systems of interest such as, for example, one-time pads and Diffie-Hellman. Maude-NPA, like the original NPA, looks for attacks by searching backwards from an insecure attack state, and assumes an unbounded number of sessions. Because of the unbounded number of sessions and the support for different equational theories, it is necessary to develop ways of reducing the search space and avoiding infinite search paths. In order for the techniques to prove useful, they need not only to speed up the search, but should not violate completeness, so that failure to find attacks still guarantees security. In this paper we describe some state space reduction techniques that we have implemented in Maude-NPA. We also provide completeness proofs, and experimental evaluations of their effect on the performance of Maude-NPA.
Introduction
The Maude-NPA [4, 7] is a tool and inference system for reasoning about the security of cryptographic protocols in which the cryptosystems satisfy different equational properties. The tool handles searches in the unbounded session model, and thus can be used to provide proofs of security as well as to search for attacks. It is the next generation of the NRL Protocol Analyzer [15] , a tool that supported limited equational reasoning and was successfully applied to the analysis of many different protocols. In Maude-NPA we improve on the original NPA in three ways. First of all, unlike NPA, which required considerable interaction with the user, Maude-NPA is completely automated (see [7] ). Secondly, its inference system has a formal basis in terms of rewriting logic and narrowing, which allows us to provide proofs of soundness and completeness (see [4] ). Finally, the tool's inference system supports reasoning modulo the algebraic properties of cryptographic and other functions (see [5, 3, 18] ). Such algebraic properties are expressed as equational theories E = E Ax whose equations E are confluent, coherent, and terminating rewrite rules modulo equational axioms Ax such as commutativity (C), associativity-commutativity (AC), or associativitycommutativity plus identity (ACU ) of some function symbols. The Maude-NPA has then both dedicated and generic methods for solving unification problems in such theories E = E Ax [10, 11, 12] , which under appropriate checkable conditions [9] yield finitary unification algorithms.
Since Maude-NPA allows reasoning in the unbounded session model, and because it allows reasoning about different equational theories (which typically generate many more solutions to unification problems than syntactic unification, leading to bigger state spaces), it is necessary to find ways of pruning the search space in order to prevent infinite or overwhelmingly large search spaces. One technique for preventing infinite searches is the generation of formal grammars describing terms unreachable by the intruder (see [15, 4] and Section 4.1). However, grammars do not prune out all infinite searches, since unbounded session security is undecidable, and there is a need for other techniques. Moreover, even when a search space is finite it may still be necessary to reduce it to a manageable size, and state space reduction techniques for doing that will be necessary. In this paper we describe some of the major state space reduction techniques that we have implemented in Maude-NPA, and provide completeness proofs and experimental evaluations demonstrating an average state-space size reduction of 99% (i.e., the average size of the reduced state space is 1% of that of the original one) in the examples we have evaluated. Furthermore, we show our combined techniques effective in obtaining a finite state space for all protocols in our experiments.
The optimizations we describe in this paper were designed specifically for Maude-NPA, and work within the context of Maude-NPA search techniques. However, although different tools use different models and search algorithms, they all have a commonality in their syntax and semantics that means that, with some adaptations, optimization techniques developed for one tool or type of tools can be applied to different tools as well. Indeed, we have already seen such common techniques arise, for example the technique of giving priority to input or output messages respectively when backwards or forwards search is used (used by us and by Shmatikov and Stern in [20] ) and the use of the lazy intruder (used by us and, in a different form, by the On-the-Fly Model Checker [1] ). One of our motivations of publishing our work on optimizations is to encourage the further interaction and adaptation of the techniques for use in different tools.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After some preliminaries in Section 2, we describe in Section 3 the model of computation used by the Maude-NPA. In Section 4, we describe the various state space reduction techniques that have been introduced to control state explosion, and give proofs of their completeness as well as showing their relations to other optimization techniques in the literature. We first briefly describe how automatically generated grammars provide the main reduction that cuts down the search space. Then, we describe how we obtain a second important state-space reduction by reducing the number of logical variables present in a state. The additional state space reduction techniques presented in this paper are: (i) giving priority to input messages in strands, (ii) early detection of inconsistent states (that will never reach an initial state), (iii) a relation of transition subsumption (to discard transitions and states already being processed in another part of the search space), and (iv) the super-lazy intruder (to delay the generation of substitution instances as much as possible). In Section 5 we describe our experimental evaluation of these state-space reduction techniques. In Section 6 we describe future work and conclude the paper. This is an extended and improved version of [6] , including proofs of all the results, a refinement of the interaction between the transition subsumption and the super-lazy intruder (Section 4.7.2), more examples and explanations, as well as more benchmarked protocols.
Background on Term Rewriting
We follow the classical notation and terminology from [20] for term rewriting and from [16, 17] for rewriting logic and order-sorted notions. We assume an order-sorted signature Σ with a finite poset of sorts (S, ≤) and a finite number of function symbols. We assume an S-sorted family X = {X s } s∈S of mutually disjoint variable sets with each X s countably infinite. T Σ (X ) s denotes the set of terms of sort s, and T Σ,s the set of ground terms of sort s. We write T Σ (X ) and T Σ for the corresponding term algebras. We write Var(t) for the set of variables present in a term t. The set of positions of a term t is written Pos(t), and the set of non-variable positions Pos Σ (t). The subterm of t at position p is t| p , and t [u] p is the result of replacing t| p by u in t. A substitution σ is a sort-preserving mapping from a finite subset of X , written Dom(σ), to T Σ (X ). The set of variables introduced by σ is Ran(σ). The identity substitution is id. Substitutions are homomorphically extended to T Σ (X ). The restriction of σ to a set of variables V is σ| V . The composition of two substitutions is (σ • θ)(X) = θ(σ(X)) for X ∈ X .
A Σ-equation is an unoriented pair t = t , where t ∈ T Σ (X ) s , t ∈ T Σ (X ) s , and s and s are sorts in the same connected component of the poset (S, ≤). Given a set E of Σ-equations, order-sorted equational logic induces a congruence relation = E on terms t, t ∈ T Σ (X ) (see [17] ). Throughout this paper we assume that T Σ,s = ∅ for every sort s. We denote the E-equivalence class of a term t ∈ T Σ (X ) as [t] E and the E-equivalence classes of all terms T Σ (X ) and T Σ (X ) s as T Σ/E (X ) and T Σ/E (X ) s , respectively.
For a set E of Σ-equations, an E-unifier for a Σ-equation t = t is a substitution σ s.t. σ(t) = E σ(t ). A complete set of E-unifiers of an equation t = t is written CSU E (t = t ). We say CSU E (t = t ) is finitary if it contains a finite number of E-unifiers. CSU(t = t ) denotes a complete set of syntactic ordersorted unifiers between terms t and t , i.e., without any equational property.
A rewrite rule is an oriented pair l → r, where l ∈ X and l, r ∈ T Σ (X ) s for some sort s ∈ S. An (unconditional) order-sorted rewrite theory is a triple R = (Σ, E, R) with Σ an order-sorted signature, E a set of Σ-equations, and R a set of rewrite rules. A topmost rewrite theory (Σ, E, R) is a rewrite theory s.t. for each l → r ∈ R, l, r ∈ T Σ (X ) State for a top sort State, r ∈ X , and no operator in Σ has State as an argument sort.
The rewriting relation
When R = (Σ, E, R) is a topmost rewrite theory, we can safely restrict ourselves to the general rewriting relation → R,E on T Σ (X ), where the rewriting
We say that a term t is R, E-irreducible if there is no term t such that t → R,E t ; this is extended to substitutions in the obvious way.
The narrowing relation R on
Assuming that E has a finitary and complete unification algorithm, the narrowing relation
The use of topmost rewrite theories is entirely natural for communication protocols, since all state transitions can be viewed as changes of the global distributed state. It also provides several advantages (see [21] ): (i) as pointed out above the relation → R,E achieves the same effect as the relation → R/E , and (ii) we obtain a completeness result between narrowing ( R,E ) and rewriting (→ R/E ).
Theorem 1 (Topmost Completeness).
[21] Let R = (Σ, E, R) be a topmost rewrite theory, t, t ∈ T Σ (X ), and let σ be a substitution such that σ(t) → * R,E t . Then, there are substitutions θ, τ and a term t such that t ; * θ,R,E t , σ(t) = E τ (θ(t)), and t = E τ (t ).
In this paper, we consider only equational theories E = E Ax such that the rewrite rules E are confluent, coherent, and terminating modulo axioms Ax such as commutativity (C), associativity-commutativity (AC), or associativity-commutativity plus identity (ACU ) of some function symbols. We also require axioms Ax to be regular, i.e., for each equation l = r ∈ Ax, Var(l) = Var(r). Note that axioms such as commutativity (C), associativitycommutativity (AC), or associativity-commutativity plus identity (ACU ) are regular. The Maude-NPA has then both dedicated and generic methods for solving unification problems in such theories E Ax [10, 11, 12] .
Maude-NPA's Execution Model
Given a protocol P, we first explain how its states are modeled algebraically. The key idea is to model protocol states as elements of an initial algebra T Σ P /E P , where Σ P is the signature defining the sorts and function symbols for the cryptographic functions and for all the state constructor symbols, and E P is a set of equations specifying the algebraic properties of the cryptographic functions and the state constructors. Therefore, a state is an E P -equivalence class [t] ∈ T Σ P /E P with t a ground Σ P -term. However, since the number of states T Σ P /E P is in general infinite, rather than exploring concrete protocol states [t] ∈ T Σ P /E P we explore symbolic state patterns [t(x 1 , . . . , x n )] ∈ T Σ P /E P (X ) on the free (Σ P , E P )-algebra over a set of variables X . In this way, a state pattern [t(x 1 , . . . , x n )] represents not a single concrete state but a possibly infinite set of such states, namely all the instances of the pattern [t(x 1 , . . . , x n )] where the variables x 1 , . . . , x n have been instantiated by concrete ground terms.
In the Maude-NPA [4, 7] , a state in the protocol execution is a term t of sort State, t ∈ T Σ P /E P (X) State . A state is then a multiset built by an associative and commutative union operator & with identity operator ∅. Each element in the multiset is either a strand or the intruder's knowledge at that state, both explained below.
A strand [13] represents the sequence of messages sent and received by a principal executing the protocol or by the intruder. A principal sending (resp. receiving) a message msg is represented by msg + (resp. msg − ). We write m ± to denote m + or m − , indistinctively. We often write +(m) and −(m) instead of m + and m − , respectively. A strand is then a list [msg
describing the sequence of send and receive actions of a principal role in a protocol, where each msg i is a term of a special sort Msg described below, i.e., msg i ∈ T Σ P /E P (X) Msg . In Maude-NPA, strands evolve over time as the send and receive actions take place, and thus we use the symbol | to divide past and future in a strand, i.e., [nil, msg 
We often remove the nils for clarity, except when there is nothing else between the vertical bar and the beginning or end of a strand. We write S P for the set of strands in the specification of the protocol P, including the strands that describe the intruder's behavior.
The intruder's knowledge is represented as a multiset of facts unioned together with an associative and commutative union operator _,_ with identity operator ∅. There are two kinds of intruder facts: positive knowledge facts (the intruder knows message expression m, i.e., m∈I), and negative knowledge facts (the intruder does not yet know m but will know it in a future state, i.e., m / ∈I). Maude-NPA uses a special sort Msg of messages that allows the protocol specifier to describe other sorts as subsorts of the top sort Msg. The specifier can make use of another special sort Fresh in the protocol-specific signature Σ for representing fresh unguessable values, e.g., nonces. The meaning of a variable of sort Fresh is that it will never be instantiated by an E-unifier generated during the protocol analysis. This ensures that if two nonces are represented using different variables of sort Fresh, they will never be identified and no approximation for nonces is necessary. We make explicit the Fresh variables r 1 , . . . , r k (k ≥ 0) generated by a strand by writing :: r 1 , . . . , r k :: [msg ± 1 , . . . , msg ± n ], where each r i appears first in an output message msg + ji and can later be used in any input and output message of msg ± ji+1 , . . . , msg ± n . Fresh variables generated by a strand are unique to that strand.
Let us introduce the well-known Diffie-Hellman protocol as a motivating example.
Example 1. The Diffie-Hellman protocol uses exponentiation to share a secret between two parties, Alice and Bob. There is a public constant, denoted by g, which will be the base of the exponentiations. We represent the product of exponents by using the symbol * . Nonces are represented by N X , denoting a nonce created by principal X. Raising message M to the power of exponent X is denoted by (M )
X . Encryption of message M using the key K is denoted by {M } K . The protocol description is as follows. Bob receives g N A and he raises it to the N B to obtain the key g N A N B . He sends a secret to Alice encrypted using the key. Likewise, when Alice receives g N B , she raises it to the N A , to obtain the key g N B N A . We assume that exponentiation satisfies the equation g N A N B = g N A * N B and that the product operation _*_ is associative and commutative, so that
and therefore both Alice and Bob share the same key.
In the Maude-NPA's formalization of the protocol, we explicitly specify the signature Σ describing the sorts and operations for messages, nonces, etc. A nonce N A is denoted by n(A, r), where r is a unique variable of sort Fresh. Concatenation of two messages, e.g., N A and N B , is denoted by the operator ; , e.g., n(A, r) ; n(B, r ). Encryption of a message M is denoted by e(A, M ), e.g., {N B } K B is denoted by e(K B , n(B, r )). Decryption is similarly denoted by d(A, M ). Raising a message M to the power of an exponent E (i.e., M E ) is denoted by exp(M, E), e.g., g N B is denoted by exp(g, n(B, r )). Associative-commutative multiplication of nonces is denoted by * . A secret generated by a principal is denoted by sec(A, r), where r is a unique variable of sort Fresh. The protocol-specific signature Σ contains the following subsort relations (Name, Nonce, Secret, Enc, Exp < Msg) and (Gen, Exp < GenvExp) and the following operators:
In the following we will use letters A, B for variables of sort Name, letters r, r , r for variables of sort Fresh, and letters M, M 1 , M 2 , Z for variables of sort Msg; whereas letters X, Y will also represent variables, but their sort will depend on the concrete position in a term. The encryption/decryption cancellation properties are described using the equations
The key algebraic property of exponentiation, z x y = z x * y , is described using the equation
in E P (where W is of sort Gen instead of the more general sort GenvExp in order to provide a finitary narrowing-based unification procedure modulo E P , see [3] for details on this concrete equational theory). Although multiplication modulo a prime number has a unit and inverses, we have only included the algebraic properties that are necessary for Diffie-Hellman to work. The two strands P associated to the protocol roles, Alice and Bob, shown above are: The following strands describe the intruder abilities according to the Dolev-Yao attacker's capabilities [2] .
All names are public
Note that the intruder cannot extract information from either an exponentiation or a product of exponents, but can only compose them. Also, the intruder cannot extract information directly from an encryption but it can indirectly by using a decryption and the cancellation of encryption and decryption, which is an algebraic property, i.e., [
Backwards Reachability Analysis
Our protocol analysis methodology is then based on the idea of backwards reachability analysis, where we begin with one or more state patterns corresponding to attack states, and want to prove or disprove that they are unreachable from the set of initial protocol states. In order to perform such a reachability analysis we must describe how states change as a consequence of principals performing protocol steps and of intruder actions. This can be done by describing such state changes by means of a set R P of rewrite rules, so that the rewrite theory (Σ P , E P , R P ) characterizes the behavior of protocol P modulo the equations E P . In the case where new strands are not introduced into the state, the corresponding rewrite rules in R P are as follows 1 , where L, L 1 , L 2 denote lists of input and output messages (+m,−m), IK, IK denote sets of intruder facts (m∈I,m / ∈I), and SS, SS denote sets of strands:
In a forward execution of the protocol strands, Rule (1) describes a message reception event in which an input message is received from the intruder; the intruder's knowledge acts in fact as the only channel through which all communication takes place. Rule (2) describes a message send in which the intruder's knowledge is not increased; it is irrelevant where the message goes. Rule (3) describes the alternative case of a send event such that the intruder's knowledge is positively increased. Note that Rule (3) makes explicit when the intruder learned a message M , which was recorded in the previous state by the negative fact M / ∈I. A fact M / ∈I can be paraphrased as: "the intruder does not yet know M , but will learn it in the future". This enables a very important restriction of the tool, expressed by saying that the intruder learns a term only once [4] : if the intruder needs to use a term twice, then he must learn it the first time it is needed; if he learns a term and needs to learn it again in a previous state, found later during the backwards search, then the state will be discarded as unreachable. Note that Rules (1)-(3) are generic: they belong to R P for any protocol P.
It is also the case that when we are performing a backwards search, only the strands that we are searching for are listed explicitly: extra strands necessary to reach an initial state are dynamically added to the state by explicit introduction through protocol-specific rewrite rules (one for each output message u + in an honest or intruder strand in S P ) as follows:
where u denotes a message, l 1 , l 2 denote lists of input and output messages (+m,−m), IK denotes a set of intruder facts (m∈I,m / ∈I), and SS denotes a set of strands. For example, intruder concatenation of two learned messages, as well as the learning of such a concatenation by the intruder, is described as follows:
This rewrite rule can be understood, in a backwards search, as "in the current state the intruder is able to learn a message that matches the pattern M 1 ; M 2 if he is able to learn message M 1 and message M 2 in prior states". In summary, for a protocol P, the set R P of rewrite rules obtained from the protocol strands S P that are used for backwards narrowing reachability analysis modulo the equational properties E P is R P = {(1), (2), (3)} ∪ (4). These rewrite rules give the basic execution model of Maude-NPA. However, as we shall see, it will later be necessary to modify them in order to optimize the search. In later sections of this paper we will show how these rules can be modified to optimize the search while still maintaining completeness. On the other hand, the assumption that algebraic properties are expressed as equational theories E = E Ax whose equations E are confluent, coherent, and terminating rewrite rules modulo regular equational axioms Ax such as commutativity (C), associativity-commutativity (AC), or associativity-commutativity plus identity (ACU ) of some function symbols, implies some extra conditions on the rewrite theory R P (see [4] ). Namely, for any term m∈I (resp. term m − ) and any E ,Ax-irreducible substitution σ, σ(m)∈I (resp. (σ(m)) − ) must be E ,Ax-irreducible. This is because many of our optimization techniques rely on the assumption that terms have a unique normal form modulo a regular equational theory, and achieve their results by reasoning about the normal forms of terms.
Finally, states have, in practice, another component containing the actual message exchange sequence between principal or intruder strands (i..e, all the expressions m ± exchanged between the honest and intruder strands). We do not make use of the message exchange sequence until Section 4.7.2, so we delay its introduction until there.
The way to analyze backwards reachability is then relatively easy, namely, to run the protocol "in reverse." This can be achieved by using the set of rules
Reachability analysis can be performed symbolically, not on concrete states but on symbolic state patterns [t(x 1 , . . . , x n )] E P by means of narrowing modulo E P (see Section 2). We call attack patterns those states patterns (i.e., terms with logical variables) used to start the narrowing-based backwards reachability analysis. An initial state is a state where all strands have their vertical bar at the beginning and there is no positive fact of the form u∈I for a message term u in the intruder's knowledge. If no initial state is found during the backwards reachability analysis from an attack pattern, the protocol has been proved secure for that attack pattern with respect to the assumed intruder capabilities and the algebraic properties. If an initial state is found, then we conclude that the attack pattern is possible and a concrete attack can be inferred from the exchange sequence stored in the initial state. Note that an initial state may be generic, in the sense of having logical variables for those elements that are not relevant for the attack.
Example 2. (Example 1 continued)
The attack pattern that we are looking for is one in which Bob completes the protocol and the intruder is able to learn the secret. The attack state pattern to be given as input to Maude-NPA is:
Using the above attack pattern Maude-NPA is able to find an initial state of the protocol, showing that the attack state is possible. Note that this initial state is generalized to two sessions in parallel: one session where Alice (i.e., principal named a) is talking to another principal B -in this session the intruder gets a nonce n(a, r) originated from a-and another session where Bob (i.e., principal named b) is trying to talk to Alice. If we instantiate B to be b, then one session is enough, although the tool returns the most general attack. The strands associated to the initial state found by the backwards search are as follows:
Note that the last two strands, generating fresh variables r, r , r , are protocol strands and the others are intruder strands. The concrete message exchange sequence obtained by the reachability analysis is the following:
Step 1) describes Bob (i.e., principal named b) receiving an initiating message from the intruder impersonating Alice.
Step 2) describes Bob sending the response, and Step 3) describes the intruder receiving it. Steps 4) through 9) describe the intruder computing the key exp(g, W * n(b, r )) she will use to communicate with Bob.
Step 10) describes Alice initiating the protocol with a principal B .
Step 11) describes the intruder receiving it, and steps 11) through 17) describe the intruder constructing the key exp(g, Z * n(a, r)) she will use to communicate with Alice. Steps 18) and 19) describe Alice receiving the response from the intruder impersonating B and Alice sending the encrypted message. Steps 20) through 22) describe the intruder decrypting the message to get the secret. In steps 23) through 25) the intruder re-encrypts the secret with the key she shares with Bob and sends it, and in Step 26) Bob receives the message.
Note that there are some intruder strands missing in the initial state because certain terms are assumed to be trivially generable by the intruder, and so not searched for; namely, intruder strands generating variable Z, variable W , term (a; b; exp(g, W )), and term (a; B ; exp(g, Z)). Variables Z and W can be filled in with any nonce, for instance nonces generated by the intruder, such as W = n(i, r ) and Z = n(i, r ) in the following way:
Also, note that nonces W and Z are used by the intruder to generate messages (a; b; exp(g, W )) and (a; B ; exp(g, Z)) in the following way:
State Space Reduction Techniques
In this section we present Maude-NPA's state space reduction techniques. Before presenting them, we formally identify two classes of states that can be safely removed: unreachable and redundant states. We begin the presentation with the notion of grammars, and its associated state space reduction technique, which is the oldest Maude-NPA technique and does much to identify and remove non-terminating search paths. In many cases (although not all) this is enough to turn an infinite search space into a finite one. We then describe a number of simple techniques which remove states that can be shown to be unreachable, thus saving the cost of searching for them. We conclude by describing two powerful techniques for eliminating redundant states: subsumption partial order reduction and the super-lazy intruder, and we prove their completeness.
First, the Maude-NPA satisfies a very general completeness result.
Theorem 2 (Completeness). [4]
Given a topmost rewrite theory R P = (Σ P , E P , R P ) representing protocol P, and a non-initial state St (with logical variables), if there is a substitution σ and an initial state St ini such that 
Our optimizations are able to identify two kinds of unproductive states: unreachable and redundant states.
Definition 1 (Unreachable States). Given a topmost rewrite theory R P = (Σ P , E P , R P ) representing protocol P, a state St (with logical variables) is unreachable if there is no sequence St ; * σ,R
Definition 2 (Redundant States). Given a topmost rewrite theory R P = (Σ P , E P , R P ) representing protocol P and a state St (with logical variables), a backwards narrowing step St ; σ1,R 
There are three reasons for wanting to detect unproductive backwards narrowing reachability steps. One is to reduce, if possible, the initially infinite search space to a finite one, as it is sometimes possible to do with the use of grammars, by removing unreachable states. Another is to reduce the size of a (possibly finite) search space by eliminating unreachable states early, i.e., before they are eliminated by exhaustive search. This elimination of unreachable states can have an effect far beyond eliminating a single node in the search space, since a single unreachable state may appear multiple times and/or have multiple descendants. Finally, if there are several steps leading to the same initial state, as for redundant states, then it is also possible to use various partial order reduction techniques that can further shrink the number of states that need to be explored.
Grammars
The Maude-NPA's ability to reason effectively about a protocol's algebraic properties is a result of its combination of symbolic reachability analysis using narrowing modulo equational properties (see Section 2), together with its grammar-based techniques for reducing the size of the search space. The key idea of grammars is to detect terms t in positive facts t∈I of the intruder's knowledge of a state St that will never be transformed into a negative fact θ(t) / ∈I in any initial state St backwards reachable from St. This means that St can never reach an initial state and therefore it can be safely discarded. Here we briefly explain how grammars work as a state space reduction technique and refer the reader to [14, 4] for further details. Automatically generated grammars G 1 , . . . , G m represent unreachability information (or co-invariants), i.e., typically infinite sets of states unreachable from an initial state. These automatically generated grammars are very important in our framework, since in the best case they can reduce the infinite search space to a finite one, or, at least, can drastically reduce the search space.
Example 3. Consider again the attack pattern ( †) in Example 2. After a couple of backwards narrowing steps, the Maude-NPA finds the following state:
which corresponds to the intruder obtaining (i.e., learning) the message sec(a, r ) from a bigger message (M ; sec(a, r )), although the contents of variable M
have not yet been found by the backwards reachability analysis. This process of adding more and more intruder strands that look for terms (M ; M ; sec(a, r )) (M ; M ; M ; sec(a, r )), . . . can go on forever. Note that if we carefully check the strands for the protocol, we can see that the honest strands either never produce a message with normal form "M ; secret" or such a message is under a public key encryption (and thus the intruder cannot get the contents), so the previous state is clearly unreachable and can be discarded. The grammar, which is generated by Maude-NPA, capturing the previous state as unreachable, is as follows:
where all the productions and exceptions refer to normal forms of messages w.r.t. the equational theory E P . Intuitively, the last production rule in the grammar above says that any term with normal form M ; M cannot be learned by the intruder if the subterm M is different from exp(g, n(A, r)) and B; exp(g, n(A, r )) (i.e., it does not match such patterns) and the constraint M / ∈I appears explicitly in the intruder's knowledge of the current state being checked for unreachability. Moreover, any term of any of the following normal forms: e(A, M ), d(A, M ), (M ; M ), or (M ; M ) cannot be learned by the intruder if subterm M is also not learnable by the intruder.
Public data
The simplest optimization possible is one that can be provided explicitly by the user. When we are searching for some data that we know is easy to learn by the intruder, the tool can avoid this by assuming that such data is public. Such data is considered public by using a special sort Public and a subsort definition, e.g. "subsort Name < Public". That is, given a state St that contains an expression t∈I in the intruder's knowledge where t is of sort Public, we can remove the expression t∈I from the intruder's knowledge, since the backwards reachability steps taken care of such a t∈I are necessary in order to lead to an initial state but their inclusion in the message sequence is superfluous. The completeness proof for this optimization is trivial and thus omitted.
Limiting Dynamic Introduction of New Strands
As pointed out in Section 3.1, rules of type (4) allow the dynamic introduction of new strands. However, new strands can also be introduced by unification of a state containing a variable SS denoting a set of strands and one of the rules of (1), (2) , and (3), where variables L and L denoting lists of input/output messages will be introduced by instantiation of SS. The same can happen with new intruder facts of the form X∈I, where X is a variable, by instantiation of a variable IK denoting the rest of the intruder knowledge. 
The following backwards narrowing step applying such a rule can be performed
but this backwards narrowing step is unproductive, since it is not guided by the information in the attack state. Indeed, the same rule can be applied again using variables SS and IK and this can be repeated many times.
In order to avoid a huge number of unproductive narrowing steps by useless instantiation, we allow the introduction of new strands and/or new intruder facts only by rule application instead of just by unification. For this, we do two things:
1. we remove any of the following variables from attack patterns: SS denoting a set of strands, IK denoting a set of intruder facts, and L, L denoting a set of input/output messages; and 2. we replace Rule (1) by the following Rule (5), since we do no longer have a variable denoting a set of intruder facts that has to be instantiated:
Note that in order to replace Rule (1) by Rule (5) we have to assume that the intruder's knowledge is a set of intruder facts without repeated elements, i.e., the union operator _,_ is ACU I (associative-commutative-identity-idempotent). This is completeness-preserving, since it is in line with the restriction in [4] that the intruder learns a term only once. Furthermore, one might imagine that Rule (3) and rules of type (4) must also be modified in order to remove the M ∈I expression from the intruder's knowledge of the right-hand side of each rule. However, this is not so, since, by keeping the expresion M ∈I, we force the backwards application of the rule only when there is indeed a message for the intruder to be learned. This provides some form of on-demand evaluation of the protocol.
The completeness proof for this optimization is trivial and thus omitted. However, since we have modified the set of rules used for backwards reachability, we prove that such modification has the same reachability capabilities. The set of rewrite rules actually used for backwards narrowing is R P = {(5), (2), (3)} ∪ (4). The following result ensures that R P and R P compute similar initial states by backwards reachability analysis. Its proof is straightforward.
Definition 3 (Inclusion)
. Given a topmost rewrite theory R P = (Σ P , E P , R P ) representing protocol P, and two states St 1 , St 2 , we abuse notation and write St 1 ⊆ E P St 2 to denote that every state element (i.e., strand or intruder fact) in St 1 appears in St 2 (modulo E P ). Proposition 1. Let R P = (Σ P , E P , R P ) be a topmost rewrite theory representing protocol P. 
Partial Order Reduction Giving Priority to Input Messages
The different rewrite rules on which the backwards narrowing search from an attack pattern is based are in general executed non-deterministically. This is because the order of execution can make a difference as to what subsequent rules can be executed. For example, an intruder cannot receive a term until it is sent by somebody, and that send action within a strand may depend upon other receives in the past. There is one exception, Rule (5) (originally Rule (1)), which, in a backwards search, only moves a negative term appearing right before the bar into the intruder's knowledge.
Example (Y, n(B, r ) ), sec(a, r )))
− but also has the intruder challenge sec(a, r )∈I, there are several possible backwards narrowing steps: some processing the intruder challenge, and Rule (5) processing the input message.
The execution of Rule (5) in a backwards search does not disable any other transitions; indeed, it only enables send transitions. Thus, it is safe to execute it at each stage before any other transition. For the same reason, if several applications of Rule 5 are possible, it is safe to execute them all at once before any other transition. Requiring all executions of Rule 5 to execute first thus eliminates interleavings of Rule 5 with send and receive transitions, which are equivalent to the case in which Rule 5 executes first. In practice, this typically cuts down in half the search space size. The completeness proof for this optimization is trivial and is thus omitted.
Similar strategies have been employed by other tools in forward searches. For example, in [19] , a strategy is introduced that always executes send transitions first whenever they are enabled. Since a send transition does not depend on any other component of the state in order to take place, it can safely be executed first. The original NPA also used this strategy; it had a receive transition (similar to the input message in Maude-NPA) which had the effect of adding new terms to the intruder's knowledge, and which always was executed before any other transition once it was enabled.
Early Detection of Inconsistent States
There are several types of states that are always unreachable or inconsistent.
Example 6. Consider again the attack pattern ( †) in Example 2. After a couple of backwards narrowing steps, the Maude-NPA finds the following state, where the intruder learns e(exp(Y, n(B, r )), sec(a, r )) by assuming she can learn exp(Y, n(B, r )) and sec(a, r ) and combines them: From this state, the intruder tries to learn sec(a, r ) by assuming she can learn messages (e(exp(Y, n(B, r )), sec(a, r ))) and exp(Y, n(B, r )) and combines them in a decryption: But then this state is inconsistent, since we have both the challenge e(exp(Y, n(B, r )), sec(a, r ))∈I and the already learned message e(exp(Y, n(B, r )), sec(a, r )) / ∈I) at the same time, violating the learn-only-once condition in Maude-NPA.
If the Maude-NPA attempts to search beyond an inconsistent state, it will never find an initial state. For this reason, the Maude-NPA search strategy always marks the following types of states as unreachable, and does not search beyond them any further:
1. A state St containing two contradictory facts t∈I and t / ∈I (modulo E P ) for a term t. Note that case 2 will become an instance of case 1 after some backwards narrowing steps, and the same happens with cases 4 and 3. The proof of inconsistency of cases 1 and 3 is straightforward.
Transition Subsumption
Partial order reduction (POR) techniques are common in state exploration. However, POR techniques for narrowing-based state exploration do not seem to have been explored in detail, although they may be extremely relevant and may afford greater reductions than in standard state exploration based on ground terms rather than on terms with logical variables. For instance, the simple concept of two states being equivalent modulo renaming of variables does not apply to standard state exploration, whereas it does apply to narrowing-based state exploration. In [8] , Escobar and Meseguer studied narrowing-based state exploration and POR techniques, which may transform an infinite-state system into a finite one. However, the Maude-NPA needs a dedicated POR technique applicable to its specific execution model. Let us motivate this POR technique with an example before giving a more detailed explanation. However, the following state is also generated after a couple of narrowing steps from the attack pattern, where, thanks to the equational theory, variable Y is instantiated to exp(G, N ) for G a generator -indeed the constant g-and N a nonce variable: However, the unreachability of the second state is implied (modulo E P ) by the unreachability of the first state; unreachability in the sense of Definition 1. Intuitively, the challenges present in the first state that are relevant for backwards reachability are included in the second state, namely, the challenges sec(a, r )∈I and exp(Y, n(B, r )∈I. Indeed, the unreachability of the following "kernel" state implies the unreachability of both states, although this kernel state is never computed by the Maude-NPA: Note that the converse is not true, i.e., the second state does not imply the first one, since it contains one more intruder item relevant for backwards reachability purposes, namely N ∈I.
Let us now formalize this state space reduction and prove its completeness. First, an auxiliary relation St 1 St 2 identifying whether St 1 is smaller than St 2 in terms of messages to be learned by the intruder.
Definition 4. Given a topmost rewrite theory R P = (Σ P , E P , R P ) representing protocol P, and two non-initial states Definition 5 (P-subsumption relation). Given a topmost rewrite theory R P = (Σ P , E P , R P ) representing protocol P and two non-initial states Proof. We prove the result by considering the different rules applicable to St 2 (remember that in R, rewriting and narrowing steps always happen at the top position). Note that property (a) is immediate because rules in R P do not remove expressions of the form m∈I. Note also that if t∈I does appear in St 2 (modulo E P ) and t / ∈I does appear in St 2 (modulo E P ), then only Rule (3) or rules of type (4) have been applied to St 2 as follows:
• Reversed version of Rule (3), i.e., St 2 ; σ2,R −1 P ,E P St 2 using the following rule
Recall that there is an intruder fact in σ 2 (θ(St 1 )) of the form t∈I for t a message term that does not appear in St 2 (modulo E P ) and t = E P σ 2 (M ). Thus, σ 2 (M )∈I does appear in σ 2 (θ(St 1 )) (modulo E P ). Here we have several cases: 1 )) , then the very same narrowing step can be performed on St 1 , i.e., there exist σ 1 , ρ such that St 1 ; σ1,R 
, has not been modified and appears in ρ(St 1 ) as well (modulo E P ), and
) appears in ρ(St 1 ) and in St 2 .
-If the strand
corresponds to a strand S P in the protocol specification that had been introduced via a rule of the set (4), where the strand's bar was clearly more to the right than in 1 ) ) of the form u∈I for u a message term, except
∈I appears in ρ(St 1 ) (modulo E P ), (iii) each non-initial strand in σ 2 (θ(St 1 )) has not been modified and appears in ρ(St 1 ) as well (modulo E P ), and
• Rules in (4), i.e., St 2 ; σ2,R −1 P ,E P St 2 using a rule of the form
Recall that there is an intruder fact in σ 2 (θ(St 1 )) of the form t∈I for t a message term that does not appear in St 2 (modulo E P ) and t = E P σ 2 (u), where u is the message term used by the rewrite rule. Thus, σ 2 (u)∈I does appear in σ 2 (θ(St 1 )) (modulo E P ). That is, the same narrowing step is available from σ 2 (θ(St 1 )) and there exist σ 1 , ρ such that St 1 ; σ1,R Lemma 4. Given a topmost rewrite theory R P = (Σ P , E P , R P ) representing protocol P and two non-initial states St 1 , St 2 . If (i) there is a substitution θ s.t. θ(St 1 ) St 2 , (ii) there is a narrowing step St 2 ; σ2,R −1 P ,E P St 2 , and (iii) there is a non-initial strand [m Proof. We prove the result by considering the different rules applicable to St 2 (remember that in R, rewriting and narrowing steps always happen at the top position). Note that property (a) is immediate because rules in R P do not remove strands, only move the vertical bar to the left of the sequences of messages in the strands. Note also that if [m • Reversed version of Rule (2), i.e., St 2 ; σ2,R
• Reversed version of Rule (5), i.e., St 2 ; σ2,R −1 P ,E P St 2 using the following rule
However, note that σ 2 | Var(St2) = id in both possible rewrite steps. Now we can formally define the relation between P-subsumption and one narrowing step. In the following, ; {0,1} σ,R −1 P ,E P denotes zero or one narrowing steps.
Lemma 5. Given a topmost rewrite theory R P = (Σ P , E P , R P ) representing protocol P and two non-initial states Preservation of reachability follows from the following main theorem. Note that the relation is applicable only to non-initial states, whereas the relation ⊆ E P of Definition 3 is applicable to both initial and non-initial states.
Theorem 3. Given a topmost rewrite theory R P = (Σ P , E P , R P ) representing protocol P and two states 
P ,E P U n . Note that n = 0, since St 2 cannot be an initial state because St 1 St 2 implies that both St 1 and St 2 are not initial states. Then, by Lemma 5, there is j ≤ n such that for each i < j, U i−1 ; ρi,R −1 P ,E P U i and there is a step
This POR technique is used as follows: we keep all the states of the backwards narrowing-based tree and compare each new leaf node of the tree with all the previous states in the tree. If a leaf node is P-subsumed by a previously generated node in the tree, we discard such leaf node.
The Super-Lazy Intruder
Sometimes terms appear in the intruder's knowledge that are trivially learnable by the intruder. These include terms initially available to the intruder (such as names) and variables. In the case of variables, specially, the intruder can substitute any arbitrary term of the same sort as the variable, 2 and so there is no need to try to determine all the ways in which the intruder can do this. For this reason it is safe, at least temporarily, to drop these terms from the state. We will refer to those terms as (super) lazy intruder terms.
Example 8. Consider again the attack pattern ( †) in Example 2. After a couple of backwards narrowing steps, the Maude-NPA finds the following state that considers how the intruder can learn sec(a, r ) by assuming he can learn a message e(K, sec(a, r )) and the key K:
Here variable K is a super-lazy term and the tool wouldn't search for values. The problem, of course, is that later on in the search the variable K may become instantiated, in which case the term then becomes relevant to the search. Indeed, after some more backwards narrowing steps, the tool tries to unify message e(K, sec(a, r ))) with an output message e(exp(X, n(A, r)), sec(A, r 2 )) of an explicitly added Bob's strand of the form :: r 1 , r 2 ::
[ (A; B; exp(g, n(A, r 1 ))) + , (B; A; X) − , (e(exp(X, n(A, r)), sec(A, r 2 ))) + ]
thus getting an instantiation for the super-lazy term K, namely {K → exp(X, n(A, r))}.
Note that the tool might continue searching for an initial state when a super lazy term is properly instantiated, and this would not cause the tool to prove an insecure protocol to be secure. However, it would lead to an unacceptably large number of false attacks because the contents of variable K are expected to be learned by the intruder too.
We take an approach similar to that of the lazy intruder of Basin et al. [1] and extend it to a more general case, that we call super-lazy terms. We note that this use of what we here call the super-lazy intruder was also present in the original NPA.
The set L(St) of super-lazy terms w.r.t. a state St is inductively generated as a subset L(St) ⊆ T Ω (Y ∪ IK 0 ) where IK 0 is the basic set of terms known by the intruder at the beginning of a protocol execution, Y is a subset of the variables of St, and Ω is the set of operations available to the intruder. The idea of super-lazy terms is that we also want to exclude from L(St) the set IK ∈ (St) of terms that the intruder does not know and all its possible combinations with symbols in Ω.
Definition 6 (Super-lazy terms). Let R P = (Σ P , E P , R P ) be a topmost rewrite theory representing protocol P. Let IK 0 be the basic set of terms known by the intruder at the beginning of a protocol execution, defined as
Let Ω be the set of operations available to the intruder, defined as
Let St be a state (with logical variables). Let IK ∈ (St) be the set of terms that the intruder does not known at state St, defined as IK ∈ (St) = {m | (m / ∈I) ∈ St, m = E P m}. The set L(St) of super-lazy terms w.r.t. St (or simply superlazy terms) is defined as
The idea behind the super-lazy intruder is that, given a term made out of lazy intruder terms, such as "a; e(K, Y )", where a is a public name and K and Y are variables, the term "a; e(K, Y )" is also a (super) lazy intruder term by applying the operations e and ; . Let us first briefly explain how the (super) lazy intruder mechanism works before formally describing it. A ghost state is a state extended to allow expressions of the form ghost(m) in the intruder's knowledge, where m is a super-lazy term. When, during the backwards reachability analysis, we detect a state St having a super lazy term t in an expression t∈I in the intruder's knowledge, we replace the intruder fact t∈I in St by ghost(t) and keep the ghost version of St in the history of states used by the transition subsumption of Section 4.6. For instance, the state ( ) of Example 8 with a super-lazy intruder term K would be represented as follows, where we have just replaced K∈I by ghost(K):
If later in the search tree we detect a ghost state St containing an expression ghost(t) such that t is no longer a super lazy intruder term, then there is a state St with an expression ghost(u) that precedes St in the narrowing tree such that the message u has been instantiated to t in an appropriate way and we must reactivate such original state St. That is, we "roll back" and replace the current state St , containing expression ghost(t), by an instantiated version of state St, namely θ(St), where t = E P θ(u). This is explained in detail in Definition 11 below.
However, if the substitution θ binding variables in u includes variables of sort Fresh, we have to keep them in the reactivated version of St, since they are unique in our model. Therefore, the strands indexed by these fresh variables must also be included in the "rolled back" state, even if they were not there originally. Moreover, they must have the bar at the place where it was when the strands were originally introduced. We show below how this is accomplished. Furthermore, if any of the strands thus introduced have other variables of sort Fresh as subterms, then the strands indexed by those variables must be included too, and so on. That is, when a state St properly instantiating a ghost expression ghost(t) is found, the procedure of rolling back to the original state St that gave rise to that ghost expression implies not only applying the bindings for the variables of t to St, but also introducing in St all the strands from St that produced fresh variables and that either appear in the variables of t or are recursively connected with them.
Example 9. For instance, after the tool finds an instantiation for variable K, the tool rolls back to the state originating the super-lazy term K as follows, where we have copied the explicitly added Bob's strand with the vertical bar at the rightmost position because it is the strand generating the Fresh variable r :
− , e(exp(X, n(a, r), sec(a, r ))) − , sec(a, r , n(B, r ) ), sec(a, r ))∈I, exp(X, n(a, r))∈I, e(exp(X, n(a, r)), sec(a, r )))∈I, sec(a, r ) / ∈I)
In order for the super-lazy intruder mechanism to be able to tell where the bar was when a strand was introduced, we must modify the set of rules of type (4) introducing new strands:
Note that rules of type (4) introduce strands [ l 1 | u + , l 2 ], whereas here rules of type (6) 
. This slight modification makes it possible to safely move the position of the bar back to the place where the strand was introduced. However, now the strands added may be partial, since the whole sequence of actions performed by the principal is not directly recorded in the strand. Therefore, the set of rewrite rules used by narrowing in reverse are now
First, we define a new relation E P between states, which is similar to ⊆ E P of Definition 3 but considers partial strands.
Definition 7 (Partial Inclusion). Given two states St 1 , St 2 , we abuse notation and write St 1 E P St 2 to denote that every intruder fact in St 1 appears in St 2 (modulo E P ) and that every strand [m
The following result ensures that if a state is reachable via backwards reachability analysis using R P , then it is also reachable using R P . Its proof is straightforward.
Proposition 2. Let R P = (Σ P , E P , R P ) be a topmost rewrite theory representing protocol P. Let St = ss & SS & (ik, IK) where ss is a term representing a set of strands, ik is a term representing a set of intruder facts, SS is a variable for strands, and IK is a variable for intruder knowledge. If there is an initial state St ini and a substitution σ such that St ; * σ,R −1 P ,E P St ini , then there is an initial state St ini and two substitutions
Now, we describe how to reactivate a state. First, we formally define a ghost state.
Definition 8 (Ghost State). Given a topmost rewrite theory R P = (Σ P , E P , R P ) representing protocol P and a state St containing an intruder fact t∈I such that t is a super-lazy term, we define the ghost version of St, written St, by replacing t∈I in St by ghost(t) in St. Now, in order to resuscitate a state, we need to formally compute the strands that are generating Fresh variables relevant to the instantiation found for the super-lazy term. Definition 10 (Fresh Generating Strands). Given a state St containing an intruder fact ghost(t) for some term t with variables, we define the set of strands associated to t, denoted strands St (t), as follows: in strands St (t), and there are i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n } s.t. r i ∈ Var(w j ), then s is included into strands St (t). Now, we formally define how to resuscitate a state.
Definition 11 (Resuscitation). Given a topmost rewrite theory R P = (Σ P , E P , R P ) representing protocol P and a state St containing an intruder fact t∈I such that t is a super-lazy term, i.e., St = ss & (t∈I, ik) where ss is a term denoting a set of strands and ik is a term denoting the rest of the intruder knowledge. St ini , θ = E P θ • ρ, and
Proof. The sequence from St to St ini can be decomposed into two fragments, computing substitutions τ , τ , respectively, such that τ is the smallest part of θ that makes τ (t) not a super-lazy term. That is, there is a state St and substitutions τ , τ such that τ (t) is not a super-lazy term,
St ini , and the sequence St ; * τ, R P −1 ,E P St can be viewed as St = St 0 ; τ1, R P Definition 12 (Void Super-Lazy Term). Given a topmost rewrite theory R P = (Σ P , E P , R P ) representing protocol P, and a state St containing an intruder fact t∈I such that t is a super-lazy term, if for each strand [m Proposition 3. Given a topmost rewrite theory R P = (Σ P , E P , R P ) representing protocol P and a state St containing an intruder fact t∈I such that t is a void super-lazy term, let St be the ghost version of St w.r. When a ghost state is reactivated, we see from the above definition that such a reactivated state will be P-subsumed by the original state that raised the ghost expression. Therefore, the transition subsumption relation of Section 4.6 has to be slightly modified to avoid checking a resuscitated state against its predecessor ghost state. Now, let us formally state this problem.
Definition 13 (Resuscitated Child). Given a topmost rewrite theory R P = (Σ P , E P , R P ) representing protocol P and two non-initial states St and St such that St contains an intruder fact t∈I and t is a super-lazy term, we say St is a resuscitated child of St, written St St , if: 
is a super-lazy term for 1 ≤ j ≤ i − 1, and τ i (t) is not a super-lazy term, and 2. given the reactivated version St of St w.r.t. St i and τ = τ 1 • · · · • τ i and
. . , St k , and a narrowing sequence
Proposition 4. Given a topmost rewrite theory R P = (Σ P , E P , R P ) representing protocol P and two non-initial states St and St such that St contains an intruder fact t∈I and t is a super-lazy term, if St St , then St St and reachability completeness is lost.
Proof. Since St is similar to St but t∈I has been replaced by ghost(t), and St contains all the strands and positive intruder facts of St but instantiated with τ | Var(t) , then for the sequences The simplest way of ensuring whether or not St 1 St 2 is to examine the relative positions of St 1 and St 2 in the search tree as well as the narrowing steps between them in the form established by Definition 13. However, for reasons of efficiency, we want to keep examinations of the search tree to a minimum, and restrict ourselves as much as possible to looking at information in the state itself. Thus, we make use of information that is already in the state, the message sequence first mentioned in Section 3.1. We find, that after making minor modifications to this message sequence to take account of resuscitated ghosts, a simple syntactic check on the sequence can provide a relation that approximates . In order to formally identify when a resuscitated state must not be erroneously discarded by , we extend protocol states to have the actual message exchange sequence between principal or intruder strands and add a new expression resuscitated(m) to indicate when a state has been resuscitated. The actual set of rewrite rules extended to compute the exchange sequence is as follows, where X is a variable denoting an exchange sequence:
Completeness reachability is obviously preserved for this set of rules and for the obvious extensions to R P and R P . For instance, the resuscitated state of Example 9 will be written as follows, where the resuscitated message is the first item in the exchange sequence: , n(B, r ) ), sec(a, r ))∈I, exp(X, n(a, r))∈I, e(exp(X, n(a, r)), sec(a, r )))∈I, sec(a, r ) / ∈I) & (resuscitated(exp(X, n(a, r))), exp(X, n(a, r))) − , e(exp(X, n(a, r)), sec(a, r ))) − ,
In [6] , we provided a very simple rule for approximating Definition 13.
Definition 14. Given a topmost rewrite theory R P = (Σ P , E P , R P ) representing protocol P and two non-initial states St 1 , St 2 , we write St 1 St 2 if either St 1 does not contain an expression ghost(m) for a message term m or St 1 does contain an expression ghost(m) for a message term m but St 2 does not contain the expression resuscitated(m).
The following result establishes that is an approximation of . The proof is straightforward.
Lemma 6. Given a topmost rewrite theory R P = (Σ P , E P , R P ) representing protocol P and two non-initial states is a bad approximation of . Here, we provide a more concise definition of the interaction between the transition subsumption and the super-lazy intruder reduction techniques.
We characterize those states after a resuscitation that are truly linked to the parent state. First, we identify those states that are directly resuscitated versions of a former state. Intuitively, by comparing the exchange sequences of the two states, we can see whether the exchange sequence of the former is (L 1 , L 2 , M − 1 , L 3 ) and it has a ghost expression ghost(M 1 ), whereas the exchange sequence of the resuscitated version is (
Definition 16. Given a topmost rewrite theory R P = (Σ P , E P , R P ) representing protocol P and two non-initial states 
Relation is closer to .
Lemma 7. Given a topmost rewrite theory R P = (Σ P , E P , R P ) representing protocol P and two non-initial states The following result establishes that + is a better approximation of than . The proof is straightforward.
Lemma 8. Given a topmost rewrite theory R P = (Σ P , E P , R P ) representing protocol P and two non-initial states Now, we can provide a better transition subsumption relation.
Definition 18 (P-subsumption relation III). Given a topmost rewrite theory R P = (Σ P , E P , R P ) representing protocol P and two non-initial states 
Experimental Evaluation
In Table 1 , we summarize the experimental evaluation of the impact of the different state space reduction techniques for various example protocols searching up to depth 4. We measure several numerical values for the techniques: (i) number of states at each backwards narrowing step, and (ii) whether the state space is finite or not. The experiments have been performed on a MacBook with 2 Gb RAM using Maude 2.6. All protocol specifications are included in the official Maude-NPA distribution 3 . The protocols are the following: (i) NSPK, states in protocols that contain several input messages in the strands, as in the NSPK protocol, but in general it simply reduces the length of the narrowing sequences and therefore more states can be generated at an earlier depth of the narrowing tree compared to the case where the optimization is not used. Table  2 summarizes the different techniques yielding a finite space for each protocol. The use of grammars and the transition subsumption are clearly the most useful techniques in general. Indeed, all examples have a finite search space thanks to the combined use of the different state space reduction techniques. Note that grammars are insufficient to obtain a finite space for the SecReT07 example, while subsumption and the super lazy intruder are essential in this case.
Concluding Remarks
The Maude-NPA can analyze the security of cryptographic protocols, modulo given algebraic properties of the protocol's cryptographic functions in executions with an unbounded number of sessions and with no approximations or data abstractions. In this full generality, protocol security properties are wellknown to be undecidable. The Maude-NPA uses backwards narrowing-based search from a symbolic description of a set of attack states by means of patterns to try to reach an initial state of the protocol. If an attack state is reachable from an initial state, the Maude-NPA's complete narrowing methods are guaranteed to prove it. But if the protocol is secure, the backwards search may be infinite and never terminate.
It is therefore very important, both for efficiency and to achieve full verification whenever possible when a protocol is secure, to use state-space reduction techniques that: (i) can drastically cut down the number of states to be explored; and (ii) have in practice a good chance to make the, generally infinite, search space finite without compromising the completeness of the analysis; that is, so that if a protocol is indeed secure, failure to find an attack in such a finite state space guarantees the protocol's security for that attack relative to the assumptions about the intruder actions and the algebraic properties. We have presented a number of state-space reduction techniques used in combination by the Maude-NPA for exactly these purposes. We have given precise characterizations of theses techniques and have shown that they preserve completeness, so that if no attack is found and the state space is finite, full verification of the given security property is achieved.
Using several representative examples we have also given an experimental evaluation of these techniques. Our experiments support the conclusion that, when used in combination, these techniques: (i) typically provide drastic state space reductions; and (ii) they can often yield a finite state space, so that whether the desired security property holds or not can in fact be decided automatically, in spite of the general undecidability of such problems.
